AI 539: TRUSTWORTHY ML MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACKS


Sanghyun Hong

sanghyun.hong@oregonstate.edu





- Threat model
 - An adversary ${\mathcal A}$ wants to know
 - if a sample $(x, y) \sim D$ is the member of
 - the training set S of an ML model f or not



Oregon State

- Threat model
 - Suppose
 - (*x*, *y*) ~ *D*; *x* is a set of features, *y* is a response
 - S is a training set drawn from D^n
 - A is a learning algorithm, l is the loss function
 - A_s is a model trained on S
 - \mathcal{A} is an adversary



- Threat model
 - Suppose
 - (*x*, *y*) ~ *D*; *x* is a set of features, *y* is a response
 - S is a training set drawn from D^n
 - A is a learning algorithm, l is the loss function
 - A_s is a model trained on S
 - \mathcal{A} is an adversary
 - Membership experiment¹
 - Sample $S \sim D^n$, and let $A_s = A(S)$
 - Choose $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ uniformly at random
 - Draw $z \sim S$ if b = 0, or $z \sim D$ if b = 1
 - $\operatorname{Exp}^{M}(\mathcal{A}, A, n, D)$ is 1 if $\mathcal{A}(z, A_{s}, n, D) = b$ and 0 otherwise. \mathcal{A} must output 0 or 1



- Threat model
 - Membership experiment¹
 - Sample $S \sim D^n$, and let $A_s = A(S)$
 - Choose $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ uniformly at random
 - Draw $z \sim S$ if b = 0, or $z \sim D$ if b = 1
 - $\operatorname{Exp}^{M}(\mathcal{A}, A, n, D)$ is 1 if $\mathcal{A}(z, A_{s}, n, D) = b$ and 0 otherwise. \mathcal{A} must output 0 or 1
 - Membership advantage¹

•
$$\operatorname{Adv}^{M}(\mathcal{A}, A, n, D) = \Pr[\mathcal{A} = 0 | b = 0] - \Pr[\mathcal{A} = 0 | b = 1]$$


= $2 \Pr[\operatorname{Exp}^{M}(\mathcal{A}, A, n, D) = 1] - 1$




- Yeom et al. attack
 - \mathcal{A}_1 : Bounded loss function
 - Suppose the loss function is bounded on *B*
 - For z = (x, y)
 - The attacker returns 1 with the probability $l(A_s, z)/B$
 - Otherwise, the attacker outputs 0



- Yeom et al. attack
 - \mathcal{A}_1 : Bounded loss function
 - Suppose the loss function is bounded on *B*
 - For z = (x, y)
 - The attacker returns 1 with the probability $l(A_s, z)/B$
 - Otherwise, the attacker outputs 0
 - (Theorem 2) \mathcal{A}_1 's advantage is $R_{\text{gen}}(A)/B$





(a) Regression and tree models assuming knowledge (b) Regression and tree models assuming knowledge of σ_S and σ_D .

(c) Deep CNNs assuming knowledge of average training loss L_S .



- Yeom et al. attack
 - \mathcal{A}_1 : Bounded loss function
 - Suppose the loss function is bounded on *B*
 - For z = (x, y)
 - The attacker returns 1 with the probability $l(A_s, z)/B$
 - Otherwise, the attacker outputs 0
 - \mathcal{A}_2 : Threshold
 - Suppose the attacker knows
 - The conditional probability density functions of the error
 - $f(\epsilon \mid b = 0)$ and $f(\epsilon \mid b = 1)$
 - such as the avg. loss over the training data (and over the test data)
 - For z = (x, y)
 - Let $\epsilon = y A_s(x)$
 - The attacker outputs $\operatorname{argmax}_{b \in \{0,1\}} f(\epsilon \mid b)$

• Evaluation

	Our work	Shokri et al. [7]				
Attack complexity	Makes only one query to the model	Must train hundreds of shadow models				
Required knowledge	Average training loss L_S	Ability to train shadow models, e.g., input distribution and type of model				
Precision	0.505 (MNIST) 0.694 (CIFAR-10) 0.874 (CIFAR-100)	0.517 (MNIST) 0.72-0.74 (CIFAR-10) > 0.99 (CIFAR-100)				
Recall	> 0.99	> 0.99				

Table 1: Comparison of our membership inference attack with that presented by Shokri et al. While our attack has slightly lower precision, it requires far less computational resources and background knowledge.




 ${}^1\!\text{Yeom}$ et al., Privacy Risks in Machine Learning: Analyzing the Connection to Overfitting

HOW CAN WE ENHANCE THE THRESHOLD ATTACK?

MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACKS AGAINST MACHINE LEARNING MODELS, SHOKRI ET AL., OAKLAND 2017

- Yeom et al. attack
 - \mathcal{A}_1 : Bounded loss function
 - Suppose the loss function is bounded on *B*
 - For z = (x, y)
 - The attacker returns 1 with the probability $l(A_s, z)/B$
 - Otherwise, the attacker outputs 0
 - \mathcal{A}_2 : Threshold
 - Suppose the attacker knows
 - The conditional probability density functions of the error
 - $f(\epsilon \mid b = 0)$ and $f(\epsilon \mid b = 1)$
 - such as the avg. loss over the training data (and over the test data)
 - For z = (x, y)
 - Let $\epsilon = y A_s(x)$
 - The attacker outputs $\operatorname{argmax}_{b \in \{0,1\}} f(\epsilon \mid b)$


- Yeom et al. attack
 - \mathcal{A}_2 : Threshold
 - Suppose the attacker knows
 - The conditional probability density functions of the error
 - $f(\epsilon \mid b = 0)$ and $f(\epsilon \mid b = 1)$
 - such as the avg. loss over the training data (and over the test data)
 - For z = (x, y)
 - Let $\epsilon = y A_s(x)$
 - The attacker outputs $\operatorname{argmax}_{b \in \{0,1\}} f(\epsilon \mid b)$
- Challenge:
 - How to compute an optimal threshold?





¹Song et al., Privacy Risks of Securing Machine Learning Models against Adversarial Examples

- Shokri et al. attack
 - Key idea: shadow models
 - The attacker has some data samples from D
 - If the attacker trains models with those samples, we know their memberships!
 - If shadow models are trained similarity, we can exploit the membership info.!
 - Attacker's data:
 - Know the labeled records: (*x*, *y*)
 - Query them to the target model and collect its predictions: ((x, y), ŷ)
 - How to train?
 - Create a train and test split
 - Use the train data to train the shadow models






- Shokri et al. attack
 - What if the attacker does not have data?
 - (*x*, *y*) from a distribution like the victim's...
 - Data generation strategies:
 - Model-based synthesis
 - Statistics-based synthesis
 - Noisy real-data

Ala	orithm 1 Data synthesis usin	a the terret model
	•	
1:	procedure Synthesize(clas	,
2:	$\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{RandRecord}()$	▷ initialize a record randomly
3:	$y_c^* \leftarrow 0$	
4:	$j \leftarrow 0$	
5:	$k \leftarrow k_{max}$	
6:		r_{max} do
7:	$\mathbf{y} \gets f_{target}(\mathbf{x})$	query the target model
8:	if $y_c \geq y_c^*$ then	\triangleright accept the record
9:	if $y_c > \mathrm{conf}_{min}$ a	and $c = rgmax(\mathbf{y})$ then
10:	if rand() $< y_{c}$	then \triangleright sample
11:	return x	▷ synthetic data
12:	end if	
13:	end if	
14:	$\mathbf{x}^{*} \leftarrow \mathbf{x}$	
15:	$y_c^* \leftarrow y_c$	
16:	$j \leftarrow 0$	
17:	else	
18:	$j \leftarrow j + 1$	
19:	if $j > rej_{max}$ the	en ▷ many consecutive rejects
20:	$k \leftarrow \max(k_{mi})$	
21:	$j \leftarrow 0$	
22:	end if	
23:	end if	
24:	$\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{RandRecord}($	$(\mathbf{x}^*, k) \triangleright$ randomize k features
25:	end for	
26:	return ⊥	▷ failed to synthesize
27:	end procedure	- •
7:	ena proceaure	




- Shokri et al. attack
 - Attack model
 - Data format $((x, y), \hat{y})$
 - Some of them are "IN" the shadow train, otherwise "OUT"
 - Combine three info. (y, \hat{y}, IN) or (y, \hat{y}, OUT)
 - Make the attack model predict IN or OUT



- Setup
 - Datasets:
 - MNIST | CIFAR-10/100
 - Purchases | Locations | Texas-100 | UCI Adult
 - Models
 - MLaaS: Google Prediction API | Amazon ML | NNs
 - MI Attack
 - Shadow models: 20 100 models
 - Defenses
 - Heuristics: Top-k | Precision | Regularization
 - [?!] In theory: DP




- MI Attacks on CIFAR
 - Shadow models: 100
 - Training set (for targets):
 - CIFAR-10: {2.5, 5, 10, 15}k samples
 - CIFAR-100: {4.5, 10, 20, 30}k samples
 - In-short: MI attacks work with a pretty reasonable acc.




- MI Attacks w. Different Models
 - Dataset: Purchase-100
 - Models (trained on 10k records):
 - Amazon ML
 - Google's Prediction API

ML Platform	Training	Test
Google	0.999	0.656
Amazon (10,1e-6)	0.941	0.468
Amazon (100,1e-4)	1.00	0.504
Neural network	0.830	0.670

- In-short: across all models, MI attacks work with a pretty reasonable acc.



- MI Attacks w. Different Shadow Models
 - Dataset: Location
 - Modification:
 - Noisy shadow training data
 - No data (synthesize it!)
 - In-short: MI attacks show robust acc. under the weak approximation of the dist.







Oregon State

- MI Attacks w. Different # classes
 - Dataset: Purchase
 - Modification:
 - # Classes: 10 100 classes (keep N(D_{tr}) the same)
 - Google Prediction API
 - In-short: More supporting data samples in the c


Dataset	Training Accuracy	Testing Accuracy	Attack Precision
Adult	0.848	0.842	0.503
MNIST	0.984	0.928	0.517
Location	1.000	0.673	0.678
Purchase (2)	0.999	0.984	0.505
Purchase (10)	0.999	0.866	0.550
Purchase (20)	1.000	0.781	0.590
Purchase (50)	1.000	0.693	0.860
Purchase (100)	0.999	0.659	0.935
TX hospital stays	0.668	0.517	0.657



Purchase Dataset, 10-100 Classes, Google, Membership Inference Attack








University Secure-AI Systems Lab (SAIL) - CS499/599: Machine Learning Security

- MI Attacks, Why Do They Work?
 - Dataset: Purchase
 - Modification:
 - # Classes: 10 100 classes (keep N(D_{tr}) the same)
 - Google Prediction API


- In-short: It may depend on a model's ability to distinguish members and non-members




• MI Attacks, Why Do They Work?




Purchase Dataset, 20 Classes, Google, Membership Inference Attack




Purchase Dataset, 100 Classes, Google, Membership Inference Attack




Purchase Dataset, 10 Classes, Google, Membership Inference Attack



Purchase Dataset, 20 Classes, Google, Membership Inference Attack



Purchase Dataset, 100 Classes, Google, Membership Inference Attack



Oregon State University

Secure-Al Systems Lab (SAIL) - CS499/599: Machine Learning Security

- Defenses
 - Top-k
 - Precision (round-ups)
 - Regularization (L_2)
- Results (on NNs)
 - Still MI attack works
 - in k = 1 (label)
 - with less precision (d = 1)
 - Regularization somewhat effective but care must be taken for a model's acc.

Purchase dataset	Testing Accuracy	Attack Total Accuracy	Attack Precision	Attack Recall	
No Mitigation	0.66	0.92	0.87	1.00	
Top $k = 3$	0.66	0.92	0.87	0.99	
Top $k = 1$	0.66	0.89	0.83	1.00	
Top $k = 1$ label	0.66	0.66	0.60	0.99	
Rounding $d = 3$	0.66	0.92	0.87	0.99	
Rounding $d = 1$	0.66	0.89	0.83	1.00	
Temperature $t = 5$	0.66	0.88	0.86	0.93	
Temperature $t = 20$	0.66	0.84	0.83	0.86	
L2 $\lambda = 1e - 4$	0.68	0.87	0.81	0.96	
L2 $\lambda = 1e - 3$	0.72	0.77	0.73	0.86	
L2 $\lambda = 1e - 2$	0.63	0.53	0.54	0.52	

Hospital dataset	Testing	Attack	Attack	Attack	
	Accuracy	Total Accuracy	Precision	Recall	
No Mitigation	0.55	0.83	0.77	0.95	
Top $k = 3$	0.55	0.83	0.77	0.95	
Top $k = 1$	0.55	0.82	0.76	0.95	
Top $k = 1$ label	0.55	0.73	0.67	0.93	
Rounding $d = 3$	0.55	0.83	0.77	0.95	
Rounding $d = 1$	0.55	0.81	0.75	0.96	
Temperature $t = 5$	0.55	0.79	0.77	0.83	
Temperature $t = 20$	0.55	0.76	0.76	0.76	
L2 $\lambda = 1e - 4$	0.56	0.80	0.74	0.92	
L2 $\lambda = 5e - 4$	0.57	0.73	0.69	0.86	
L2 $\lambda = 1e - 3$	0.56	0.66	0.64	0.73	
L2 $\lambda = 5e - 3$	0.35	0.52	0.52	0.53	




How should we measure membership inference success?

MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACKS FROM FIRST PRINCIPLE, CALINI ET AL., OAKLAND 2022

Secure-AI Systems Lab (SAIL) - CS499/599: Trustworthy ML

REVISITING YEOM ET AL. AND SHOKRI ET AL. ATTACK

- Metrics for measuring the attack success
 - Membership advantage (Yeom et al.)
 - Precision (Shokri et al.)
 - AUROC (Jayaraman et al.)





...

REVISITING YEOM ET AL. AND SHOKRI ET AL. ATTACK

- Metrics for measuring the attack success
 - Problem of existing metrics
 - Symmetric: equal cost to false-positives and false-negatives
 - Average-case metric: often in security, we are interested in a certain subset
 - LOSS attack
 - Metrics:
 - Membership advantage
 - Precision
 - AUROC
 - Problem: perform at random at low-FPR




Fig. 2: ROC curve for the LOSS baseline membership inference attack, shown with both linear scaling (left), also and log-log scaling (right) to emphasize the low-FPR regime.



REVISITING YEOM ET AL. AND SHOKRI ET AL. ATTACK

- Metrics for measuring the attack success
 - Problem of existing metrics
 - Symmetric: equal cost to false-positives and false-negatives
 - Average-case metric: often in security, we are interested in a certain subset
 - LOSS attack
 - Metrics: membership advantage or precision
 - Problem: perform at random at low-FPR




Fig. 2: ROC curve for the LOSS baseline membership inference attack, shown with both linear scaling (left), also and log-log scaling (right) to emphasize the low-FPR regime.



- LiRA (The likelihood ratio attack)
 - Per-sample hardness score
 - Not all examples are equal
 - Some samples are easier to fit
 - Some samples have a larger separability
 - It does not matter if it is an inlier or outlier




Fig. 3: Some examples are easier to fit than others, and some have a larger separability between their losses when being a member of the training set or not. We train 1024 models on random subsets of CIFAR-10 and plot the losses for four examples when the example is a member of the training set $(\tilde{\mathbb{Q}}_{in}(x, y), \text{ in red})$ or not $(\tilde{\mathbb{Q}}_{out}(x, y), \text{ in blue})$.



- LiRA (The likelihood ratio attack)
 - Per-sample hardness score
 - Not all examples are equal
 - Some samples are easier to fit
 - Some samples have a larger separability
 - It does not matter if it is an inlier or outlier
 - Proposed attack
 - Compute per-sample hardness scores
 - Use parametric modeling




Fig. 4: The model's confidence, or its logarithm (the crossentropy loss) are not normally distributed. Applying the logit function yields values that are approximately normal.

Oregon State

target example, estimate mean and variance of the loss distributions, and compute a likelihood ratio test. (In our **offline** variant, we omit lines 5, 6, 10, and 12, and instead return the prediction by estimating a single-tailed distribution, as is shown in Equation (4).) **Require:** model f, example (x, y), data distribution \mathbb{D} 1: confs_{in} = {}

Kequite. model f , example (x, g)	
1: $confs_{in} = \{\}$	
2: $confs_{out} = \{\}$	
3: for N times do	
4: $D_{\text{attack}} \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{D}$	▷ Sample a shadow dataset
5: $f_{\text{in}} \leftarrow \mathcal{T}(D_{\text{attack}} \cup \{(x, y)\})$	▷ train IN model
6: $\operatorname{confs_{in}} \leftarrow \operatorname{confs_{in}} \cup \{\phi(f_{in}(x))\}$	$\{y\}_{y}\}$
7: $f_{\text{out}} \leftarrow \mathcal{T}(D_{\text{attack}} \setminus \{(x, y)\})$	⊳ train OUT model
8: $\operatorname{confs}_{\operatorname{out}} \leftarrow \operatorname{confs}_{\operatorname{out}} \cup \{\phi(f_{\operatorname{out}})\}$	$(x)_y)\}$
9: end for	
10: $\mu_{ ext{in}} \leftarrow \texttt{mean}(ext{confs}_{ ext{in}})$	
11: $\mu_{\text{out}} \leftarrow \texttt{mean}(\texttt{confs}_{\text{out}})$	
12: $\sigma_{in}^2 \leftarrow var(confs_{in})$	
13: $\sigma_{\text{out}}^2 \leftarrow \text{var}(\text{confs}_{\text{out}})$	
14: $\operatorname{conf}_{\operatorname{obs}} = \phi(f(x)_y)$	▷ query target model
15: return $\Lambda = rac{p(ext{conf}_{ ext{obs}} \mid \mathcal{N})}{p(ext{conf}_{ ext{obs}} \mid \mathcal{N})}$	$\left(egin{aligned} & \mu_{ ext{in}}, \sigma_{ ext{in}}^2 \end{pmatrix}) \ & \sigma_{ ext{out}}, \sigma_{ ext{out}}^2 \end{pmatrix} \end{pmatrix}$

Algorithm 1 Our online Likelihood Ratio Attack (LiRA).

We train shadow models on datasets with and without the

- Setup
 - Datasets: CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, ImageNet and WikiText
 - Models
 - Wide-ResNet (CIFAR-10 and -100)
 - ResNet-50 (ImageNet)
 - GPT-2 small (WikiText)
 - LiRA setup
 - Shadow models: 65 for ImageNet and 256 for others
 - Repeat the attack 10 times
 - Metric
 - TPR at 1% FPR
 - ROC curve




• LiRA (online) attack vs others

	shadow models multiple queries		class hardness	hardness example hardness	TPR @ 0.001% FPR		TPR @ 0.1% FPR			Balanced Accuracy			
Method	sha mo	um	class hardr	exa har	C-10	C-100	WT103	C-10	C-100	WT103	C-10	C-100	WT103
Yeom et al. [70]	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	0.00%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	59.4%	78.0%	50.0%
Shokri et al. [60]	\bullet	\bigcirc	•	\bigcirc	0.0%	0.0%	_	0.3%	1.6%	_	59.6%	74.5%	-
Jayaraman et al. [25]	\bigcirc	\bullet	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	0.0%	0.0%	_	0.0%	0.0%	_	59.4%	76.9%	_
Song and Mittal [61]	\bullet	0	•	\bigcirc	0.0%	0.0%	_	0.1%	1.4%	_	59.5%	77.3%	-
Sablayrolles et al. [56]	\bullet	\bigcirc	•	\bullet	0.1%	0.8%	0.01%	1.7%	7.4%	1.0%	56.3%	69.1%	65.7%
Long et al. [37]	\bullet	\bigcirc	•	\bullet	0.0%	0.0%	_	2.2%	4.7%	_	53.5%	54.5%	-
Watson et al. [68]	\bullet	0	•	\bullet	0.1%	0.9%	0.02%	1.3%	5.4%	1.1%	59.1%	70.1%	65.4%
Ye et al. [69]	•	0	•	\bullet	-	-	-	-	-	-	60.3%	76.9%	65.5%
Ours	•	•	•	•	2.2%	11.2%	0.09%	8.4%	27.6%	1.4%	63.8%	82.6%	65.6%

TABLE I: **Comparison of prior membership inference attacks** under the same settings for well-generalizing models on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and WikiText-103 using 256 shadow models. Accuracy is only presented for completeness; we do not believe this is a meaningful metric for evaluating membership inference attacks. Full ROC curves are presented in Appendix A.



- LiRA (online) attack vs others
 - 10x more successful than the prior attacks at the low-FPR region (0.001 0.1 FPR)



- LiRA (online) attack and the generalization gap
 - Overfitted models tend to vulnerable to the attack
 - There are models with the identical gaps 100x times vulnerable
 - More accurate models are more vulnerable to the attack





Fig. 7: Attack true-positive rate versus model train-test gap for a variety of CIFAR-10 models.



- LiRA (online) attack with different settings
 - While the training configurations are different from shadow models to the target
 - LiRA attack performs consistently; the attack is agnostic to the training setups



(a) Vary model architecture.

(b) Vary training optimizer.

(c) Vary data augmentation.

Fig. 11: Our attack succeeds when the adversary is uncertain of the target model's training setup. We vary the target model's architecture (a), the training optimizer (b) and the data augmentation (c), as well as the adversary's guess of each of these properties when training shadow models. The attack performs best when the adversary guesses correctly (black-lined markers).



Thank You!

Sanghyun Hong

https://secure-ai.systems/courses/MLSec/current



