CS 370: INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY 05.09: WEB SECURITY BASICS

Tu/Th 4:00 - 5:50 PM

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SOME FUN TOPICS!

- Societal issues by large language models
 - https://mastodon.social/@danluu/110335983520055904
 - [Extra-credit opportunity: 5%] Write a CTF report with ChatGPT



TOPICS FOR TODAY

- Recap: SSL and TLS security
 - SSL/TLS handshakes (hello-s)
 - (Perfect) Forward Security



RECAP: THE INTERNET WITHOUT SECURITY





Everybody in the Middle Knows That I Searched 'dogs' and They Also Know the Search Result... Ugh...



RECAP: THE INTERNET WITH A SECURE MECHANISM (SSL/TLS) e mans never know **DH exchange keys!!** Check certificate, exchange keys, apply encryption with HMAC DB Search "Dog" I know these two are Search "Dog" communicating but not about the secret key... 0x1ce42780dfa1cea 089a9ea00de059ef5

The Middlemen Will Only See the Encrypted Contents They Will Never Know the Secret Key ...



RECAP: WHY TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY (TLS)?

• Independent from the application running on a host





Client (You)

- 1. Send 'client hello'
 - Version
 - Random number
 - Cipher suites available

Server (oregonstate.edu)

• 2. Send 'server hello'

- Version

- Random number
- Cipher suites chosen
- 3. Send 'server certificate'
 - Full chain of digital certificates



Client (You)

• 1. Send 'client hello'

Server (oregonstate.edu)

- 2. Send 'server hello'
- 3. Send 'server certificate'
 - 4. Server key exchange
 - Send ECDHE public values
- Signed by the server's private key
 - 5. 'server hello' done



Client (You)

• 1. Send 'client hello'

Server (oregonstate.edu)

- 2. Send 'server hello'
- 3. Send 'server certificate'
 - 4. Server key exchange
 - Send ECDHE public values
- Signed by the server's private key
 - 5. 'server hello' done

- 6. Client key exchange
 - Send ECDHE public values (client)



Client (You)

regon State

• 1. Send 'client hello'

Server (oregonstate.edu)

- 2. Send 'server hello'
- 3. Send 'server certificate'
 - 4. Server key exchange
 - 5. 'server hello' done

- 6. Client key exchange
- 7. Change cipher spec
- 8. Handshake message (encrypted)

- 9. Change cipher spec
- 10. Handshake message (encrypted)

Now, We Can Start Communicating with Encrypted MSG!

- Send/receive application data
 - Both client and server will send encrypted data
 - [encrypted data] [MAC]
 - Server: server_write_key and server_write_mac_key
 - Client : client_write_key and client_write_mac_key

```
To generate the key material, compute
```

until enough output has been generated. Then, the key_block is partitioned as follows:

```
client_write_MAC_key[SecurityParameters.mac_key_length]
server_write_MAC_key[SecurityParameters.mac_key_length]
client_write_key[SecurityParameters.enc_key_length]
server_write_key[SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length]
server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length]
```



TOPICS FOR TODAY

- Recap: SSL and TLS security
 - SSL/TLS handshakes (hello-s)
 - Perfect) Forward Security
 - Example: a web-server with HTTPs



EXAMPLE: A WEB SERVER

• Suppose we talk to a webserver (HTTP)





EXAMPLE: A WEB SERVER

• Suppose we talk to a webserver (HTTP)





HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 12:53:12 GMT Expires: -1 Cache-Control: private, max-age=0 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO P3P: CP="This is not a P3P policy! S Server: gws X-XSS-Protection: 0 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN



EXAMPLE: A WEB SERVER

• Suppose we use HTTPs (instead of HTTP)







Run TLS handshake to establish a secure channel

•••••





A WEB SERVER EXAMPLE



HTTP/1.0 200 0K Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 12:53:12 GMT Expires: -1 Cache-Control: private, max-age=0 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISC P3P: CP="This is not a P3P policy! S Server: gws X-XSS-Protection: 0 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN



4 0.010756057 10.248.25.87	142.250.69.196	HTTP 1	44 GET	T / HTTP/1.	1			
4 0.010756057 10.248.25.87	142.250.69.196	HTTP 1. GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.google.com User-Agent: cul/7.81 Accept: */* HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 Expires: -1 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/htt P3P: CP="This is not a Server: gws X-XSS-Protection: 0 X-Frame-Options: SAME Set-Cookie: 1P_JAR=20 Set-Cookie: 1P_JAR=20 Set-Cookie: 1P_JAR=20 Set-Cookie: NID=511=M MANHFIDpvagPc6jwK61=-2 HP9FQI6DbeY6GLGCma0MBd path=/; domain=.googl Accept-Ranges: none Vary: Accept-Encoding: cht 348f html <httl content="Search the wt special features to ht content="inages/brand title><script <br="" nonce="
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LET'S SEE HOW HTTPS PACKETS LOOK LIKE

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BENEFIT OF USING TLS

- TLS establishes a secure communication channel
 - Over the insecure Internet
 - Adds authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity to the channel
- Applications don't have to change their protocol
 - Just wrap the protocol with TLS
- How can we make HTTP secure?
 - Wrap with TLS: https://...



How can we use TLS?

- Many libraries are available
 - OpenSSL
 - libsodium
 - bouncycastle
 - SSL/TLS support in many other languages (Python, etc.)
- Just wrap with this
 - What does it mean???



EXAMPLE: PYTHON WEBSERVER AND CLIENT

- Suppose we do the followings:
 - Send 'Hello' to the server
 - Receive a number from the server
 - Add one to the number and send back to the server



NON-TLS: CLIENT

- Suppose we ..
 - Send 'Hello' to the server
 - Receive a number from the server
 - Add one to the number and send this back to the server



```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
```

import socket

```
def main():
    client_socket = socket.socket()
    client_socket.connect(('127.0.0.1', 31337))
```

```
print("Sending Hello...")
client_socket.send(b'Hello\n')
```

```
b_number = client_socket.recv(5)
s_number = str(b_number, 'utf-8')
print("Received %s" % s_number.strip())
```

```
i_number = int(s_number)
i_answer = i_number + 1
```

```
print("Returning %d" % i_answer)
b_answer = bytes(str(i_answer), 'utf-8')
client_socket.send(b_answer)
```

```
result = client_socket.recv(10)
print(result)
```

```
client_socket.close()
```

```
if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()
```

Non-TLS: Server

- Suppose we ..
 - Send 'Hello' to the server
 - Receive a number from the server
 - Add one to the number and send this back to the server

```
//usr/bin/env python3
import os
import random
import socket
import sys
def main():
    server socket = socket.socket()
    server socket.bind(('127.0.0.1', 31337))
    server socket.listen(10)
    while True:
        conn, addr = server socket.accept()
        if os.fork():
            conn.close()
        else:
            message = conn.recv(6)
            if (message != b'Hello\n'):
                sys.exit(-1)
            print(b"Received %s" % message)
            number = random.randint(1000,9999)
            print("Sending %d" % number)
            conn.send(bytes(str(number)+'\n', 'utf-8'))
            message = conn.recv(5)
            print(b"Received %s" % message)
            if number+1 != int(str(message, 'utf-8')):
                conn.send(b"Incorrect\n")
                print("Incorrect")
            else:
                conn.send(b" Correct\n")
                print("Correct")
            conn.close()
            sys.exit(0)
```

name == ' main ':

main()



NON-TLS CLIENT VS TLS CLIENT

/usr/bin/env python3	1 #!/usr/bin/env python3
port socket	3 import socket 4 import ssl
f main(): client_socket = socket.socket()	5 6 def main(): 7 client_socket = socket.socket()
	8 9 context = ssl.create_default_context() 10 context.check_hostname = False # bad exa 11 context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE # bad exa
<pre>client_socket.connect(('127.0.0.1', 31337))</pre>	<pre>12 13 client_socket.connect(('127.0.0.1', 31337)) 14 ssl_client_socket = context.wrap_socket(client_socket)</pre>
<pre>print("Sending Hello") client_socket.send(b'Hello\n')</pre>	<pre>15 16 print("Sending Hello") 17 ssl_client_socket.send(b'Hello\n') 17</pre>
<pre>b_number = client_socket.recv(5) s_number = str(b_number, 'utf-8') print("Received %s" % s_number.strip())</pre>	<pre>19 b_number = ssl_client_socket.recv(5) 20 s_number = str(b_number, 'utf-8') 21 print("Received %s" % s_number.strip())</pre>
i_number = int(s_number) i_answer = i_number + 1	22 23 i_number = int(s_number) 24 i_answer = i_number + 1
<pre>print("Returning %d" % i_answer) b_answer = bytes(str(i_answer), 'utf-8') client_socket.send(b_answer)</pre>	25 26 print("Returning %d" % i_answer) 27 b_answer = bytes(str(i_answer), 'utf-8') 28 <mark>ssl_</mark> client_socket.send(b_answer)
<pre>result = client_socket.recv(10) print(result)</pre>	30 result = ssl_client_socket.recv(10) 31 print(result)
client_socket.close()	32 33 ssl_client_socket.close()
name == 'main':	34 35 ifname == 'main': 36 main()

Non-TLS server vs TLS server

1 #1/ucr/hip/ony python?	1 #1/usr/hin/ony nython?
Name: (null)	2
Profile: (null) S	3 import os
Commandom andom	4 import random
5 import socket	5 import socket
	6 Import ssl
import sys	/ import sys
def main():	def main():
<pre>server socket = socket.socket()</pre>	10 server socket = socket.socket()
<pre>server socket.bind(('127.0.0.1', 31337))</pre>	11 server socket.bind(('127.0.0.1', 31337))
server_socket.listen(10)	12 server_socket.listen(10)
2	13 14 context = ssl.SSlContext(ssl.PR0T0C0L_TLS_SERVER)
	context.load cert chain('cert.pem', 'kev.pem')
	<pre>16 ssl_server_socket = context.wrap_socket(server_socket, server_side=True)</pre>
	17
3 while True:	18 while True:
<pre>conn, addr = server_socket.accept() </pre>	<pre>conn, addr = ssl_server_socket.accept() </pre>
it os.tork():	20 IT OS.TOPK():
$e_{\text{constraint}} = constraint} (6)$	22 etse.
if (message != b'Hello\n'):	24 if (message = b'Hello\n'):
svs.exit(-1)	25 svs.exit(-1)
print(b"Received %s" % message)	- 26 print(b"Received %s" % message)
number = random.randint(1000,9999)	27 number = random.randint(1000,9999)
3 print("Sending %d" % number)	28 print("Sending %d" % number)
4 conn.send(bytes(str(number)+'\n', 'utf-8'))	29 conn.send(bytes(str(number)+'\n', 'utf-8'))
5 message = conn.recv(5)	30 message = conn.recv(5)
<pre>print(b"Received %s" % message) if if it is the set of the se</pre>	31 print(b"Received %s" % message)
<pre>it number+1 != int(str(message, 'utt-8')):</pre>	32 IT NUMBER+1 != INT(STR(MESSAGE, 'UTT-8')):
print("Troorrect")	1 34 print("Theorrect")
else:	1 35 else:
conn.send(b" Correct\n")	1 36 conn.send(b" Correct\n")
2 print("Correct")	37 print("Correct")
3 conn.close()	38 conn.close()
4 sys.exit(0)	39 sys.exit(0)
b	
/ ITname == 'main':	42 lTname == 'main':
 Main() Secure Al Systems Lab (SAIL) :: CS370 - Introduction to Security 	30

TOPICS FOR TODAY

• Recap: SSL and TLS security

- SSL/TLS handshakes (hello-s)
- (Perfect) Forward Security
- Example: a web-server with HTTPs
- Web security (authentication)
 - Password
 - Dictionary attack
 - SQL injection attack



WWW: WORLD-WIDE WEB

• WWW

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- Formal: An information system enabling documents and other web resources to be accessed over the Internet
- Informal: the Internet for non-techie folks
- Uses HTTP as a document-delivery protocol
 - Request: GET /index.html HTTP/1.0\r\n
 - Response: 200 OK HTTP/1.0\r\n
 - ... contents ...





How can we do access control on the web?

- Suppose we don't have access control
 - Anyone can access any document via URLs (:= uniform resource locator)
 - http://www.bankofamerica.com/<your_account>
- We can apply access control on our websites
 - Use passwords
 - On the bankofamerica.com, type:
 - ID : your-account
 - PW: your-password



HTTP BASIC AUTHENTICATION

- HTTP basic authentication
 - A simple challenge and response mechanism
 - A server can request authentication information (ID and Password) from a client

$\leftarrow \ \rightarrow $	G	()	cs370.unexj	ploitable.syst	tems/_st	tatic/hid	den/inde	ex.htn
Sign in								
https://cs3	70.un	exploit	able.systems					
Username								
Password								
			Cancel	Sign In				



HTTP BASIC AUTHENTICATION: IN SECURE

• HTTP basic authentication

- A simple challenge and response mechanism
- A server can request authentication information (ID and Password) from a client

	1 0.000000000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	HTTP	1012 GET /_static/hidden/index.html HTTP/1.1
	2 0.001963698	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.53	DNS	83 Standard query 0x522c A safebrowsing.google.com
3	3 0.002251748	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	74 53732 → 8080 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65495 Len=0 MSS=65495 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=1993954412 TSec.
	4 0.002275826	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	74 8080 → 53732 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65483 Len=0 MSS=65495 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=1993.
	5 0.002306468	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	66 53732 → 8080 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65536 Len=0 TSval=1993954413 TSecr=1993954413
	6 0.017663091	127.0.0.53	127.0.0.1	DNS	118 Standard query response 0x522c A safebrowsing.google.com CNAME sb.l.google.com A 142.
₄∟	7 0.025120028	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	HTTP	254 HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified

• Monitor the stream:

	Mark/Unmark Packet Ignore/Unignore Packet Set/Unset Time Reference Time Shift Packet Comment	i da	en/index.html HTT 522c A safebrowsi Seq=0 Win=65495 ACK] Seq=0 Ack= Seq=1 Ack=1 Win sponse 0x522c A s
	Edit Resolved Name Apply as Filter Prepare as Filter Conversation Filter Colorize Conversation SCTP	* * * * *	Yodified
2	Follow Copy		TCP Stream UDP Stream TLS Stream
9	Protocol Preferences Decode As Show Packet in New Windo	• w	HTTP Stream HTTP/2 Stream QUIC Stream

regon State

	GET /_static/hidden/index.html HTTP/1.1
	Authorization: Basic Ymx1ZTkwNTc6Y3MzNzB7QjRzSWNfQXVUaF9JNV90MHRfczNDdVIzfQ==
1	opgrade-Insecure-Requests. I
	User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/106.0.0.0
	Safari/537.36
	Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/
	<pre>*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9</pre>
	Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
	Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
	Cookie: _jsuid=1158429791;
	experimentation_subject_id=eyJfcmFpbHMiOnsibWVzc2FnZSI6Iklqa3paak01WVdZekxUYzB0V0V0TkdJMU5pMDVZelpsTFRV
	<pre>@5HUm1abVExTlRKak9DST0iLCJleHAi0m51bGwsInB1ciI6ImNvb2tpZS5leHBlcmltZW50YXRpb25fc3ViamVjdF9pZCJ9fQ%3D%3D</pre>
	-14df51e13094f383b80e4b21ff0c195dd82560ed; _jsuid=1158429791
	If-None-Match: W/"6360b363-25"
	If-Modified-Since: Tue, 01 Nov 2022 05:49:23 GMT
	HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified
	Server: nginx/1.14.0 (Ubuntu)
	pate: lue, 01 Nov 2022 06:01:09 GMT
	Last-Modified: Tue, 01 Nov 2022 05:49:23 GMT
	Lonnection: keep-alive
	E 120 * "636/0363-25"

Secure AI Systems Lab (SAIL) :: CS370 - Introduction to Security

- Uses Base64 Encoding
 - Binary to Text encoding
 - Uses printable 64-characters
- Suppose you have a string "ASD"
 - 01000001 01010011 01000100
 - 010000 010101 001101 000100 (6 bits)
 - Q V N E

>>> base64.b64encode(b"ASD")
b'QVNE'

Index	Binary	Char									
0	000000	A	16	010000	Q	32	100000	g	48	110000	w
1	000001	в	17	010001	R	33	100001	h	49	110001	x
2	000010	С	18	010010	S	34	100010	i	50	110010	У
3	000011	D	19	010011	т	35	100011	j	51	110011	z
4	000100	E	20	010100	U	36	100100	k	52	110100	0
5	000101	F	21	010101	v	37	100101	1	53	110101	1
6	000110	G	22	010110	W	38	100110	m	54	110110	2
7	000111	H	23	010111	x	39	100111	n	55	110111	3
8	001000	I	24	011000	Y	40	101000	0	56	111000	4
9	001001	J	25	011001	Z	41	101001	р	57	111001	5
10	001010	K	26	011010	a	42	101010	q	58	111010	6
11	001011	L	27	011011	b	43	101011	r	59	111011	7
12	001100	м	28	011100	с	44	101100	s	60	111100	8
13	001101	N	29	011101	d	45	101101	t	61	111101	9
14	001110	0	30	011110	е	46	101110	u	62	111110	+
15	001111	P	31	011111	f	47	101111	v	63	111111	1
Pa	dding	=									



THE STRING IN THE AUTHORIZATION FIELD: BINARY TO STRING

- Uses Base64 Encoding
 - Binary to Text encoding
 - Uses printable 64-characters
- Suppose you have a string "ffe0e8" (hex)
 - 11111111 11100000 11101000
 - 111111 111110 000011 101000 (6 bits)
 - -/ + D

>>> base64.b64encode(b"\xff\xe0\xe8")
b'/+Do'

0

Index	Binary	Char									
0	000000	A	16	010000	Q	32	100000	g	48	110000	w
1	000001	в	17	010001	R	33	100001	h	49	110001	x
2	000010	С	18	010010	S	34	100010	i	50	110010	У
3	000011	D	19	010011	т	35	100011	j	51	110011	z
4	000100	E	20	010100	U	36	100100	k	52	110100	0
5	000101	F	21	010101	v	37	100101	1	53	110101	1
6	000110	G	22	010110	W	38	100110	m	54	110110	2
7	000111	H	23	010111	x	39	100111	n	55	110111	3
8	001000	I	24	011000	Y	40	101000	0	56	111000	4
9	001001	J	25	011001	Z	41	101001	р	57	111001	5
10	001010	K	26	011010	a	42	101010	q	58	111010	6
11	001011	L	27	011011	b	43	101011	r	59	111011	7
12	001100	м	28	011100	с	44	101100	s	60	111100	8
13	001101	N	29	011101	d	45	101101	t	61	111101	9
14	001110	0	30	011110	е	46	101110	u	62	111110	+
15	001111	P	31	011111	f	47	101111	v	63	111111	1
Pa	dding	=									



- Base64 encoding
 - All printable characters
 - Has / and + in addition to
 - [A-Za-z0-9]
- DIT (Micro-lab)
 - https://www.base64decode.net/
 - bmV1cm9u/b3ZlcmZsb3c6Y3MzNzB7Q+jRzSWNfQXV/USF9JNV9OMFRfczNDdVlzfQ==



HTTP BASIC AUTHENTICATION: IMPLICATIONS

- We can use HTTP basic auth.
 - To do access control on our webpages
 - Users need to type the matching username and password
 - Otherwise, you can't access the page
- It is insecure:
 - HTTP packets are unencrypted
 - base64Encode(username:password) is there!



SOLUTION: HTTPS

• Let's use HTTPS



• No one other than the server/client can see the content!



SOLUTION: HTTPS

• Let's use HTTPS



• No one other than the server/client can see the content!



THE PASSWORDS WILL BE STORED TO THE SERVER

So, anyone who can access the server can see them

Home > Email Security



online, 2 million records leaked as proof **Bed Bath & Beyond Invest** Jodated on: 20 February 2023 3 9 After Employee Falls for P Ē

By Eduard Kovacs on November 01, 2022 in Share Recommend 0

Y Tweet

Bed Bath & Beyond revealed last week in an SEC filin breach after an employee fell victim to a phishing at

This is not the first time Bed Bath & Beyond has disclosed the retailer revealed that some customer accounts had b hackers had obtained username and password combination of 🔽 👩 📠 🔽 company and relied on the fact that many people use the online accounts.



Scraped data of 500 million LinkedIn users being sold

Cybernews Team Cybernews Tear

Updated on 07/04: We updated our personal data leak checker database with more than 780,000 email addresses associated with this leak. Use it to find out if your LinkedIn profile has been scraped by the threat actors

Days after a massive Facebook data leak made the headlines, it seems like we're in for another one, this time involving LinkedIn.

An archive containing data purportedly scraped from 500 million LinkedIn profiles has been put for sale on a popular hacker forum, with another 2 million records leaked as a proof-of-concept sample by the post author.

Editor's choice



Quantum computing race explained: fast and furious

by Stefanie Schappert (\$ 05 May 2023

The World Economic Forum (WEF) published several think pieces this year describing a post-quantum computing world in which the global chasm between developed and underdeveloped populations only grows larger. But could the gloomy forecast be rosier than expected?





Al anxiety: the daunting prospect of mass unemployment (04 May 2023



Fake Instagram sugar daddy nimics Premier League mogul to



42

THE PASSWORDS WILL BE STORED TO THE SERVER

So, anyone who can access the server can see them

RSS

```
Home > Email Security
```



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The World Economic Forum (WEF) published several think pieces this year describing a post-quantum computing world in which the global chasm between developed and underdeveloped populations only grows larger. But could the gloomy forecast be rosier than

hackers had obtained username and password combinatic 👩 🚽 👩 📾 🔽 company and relied on the fact that online accounts.

Attackers put webservers on their radar; it can be hacked! Passwords stored in the server could also be leaked



How can we address this issue?

- We can hide the passwords from the server
 - Do not store the passwords directly
 - Do store SHA256("some_secret (salt)" + password)
 - Example:
 - SHA256("some_secret (salt)" + "my-super-secure-password!@#\$11")
 - 59636881ab9bf34263cf3f4d90f25d2b91e74e8804b802d25c8f4bc5c80846ee



- Hash the password
 - SHA256("some_secret (salt)" + "my-super-secure-password!@#\$11")
 - 59636881ab9bf34263cf3f4d90f25d2b91e74e8804b802d25c8f4bc5c80846ee
- Can an adversary reconstruct the password from the hash?
 - SHA256
 - One-way function
 - Many x exists that satisfies H(x) = y
 - SHA256('Hello, world') = SHA256('Something else')
 - Good luck!



SECURE PRACTICE: DO NOT USE HTTP BASIC AUTH

• Let's use the login form



User Name or Email



Password



password?

Submit



SECURE PRACTICE: DO USE THE PASSWORD AUTHENTICATION

• Send ID/password but the server stores hash of the password

neuronoverflow: 59636881ab9bf34263cf3f4d90f25d2b91e74e8804b802d25c8f4bc5c80846ee



LET'S THINK ABOUT HOW THE SERVER SHOULD WORK

- The server's procedure
 - A user enters their ID and password
 - The server queries the database to find (Username, SHA256('some secret' + password))
 - If exists, allow log-in
 - If not, then reject the request



LET'S THINK ABOUT HOW THE SERVER SHOULD WORK

- The server searches the database
- Suppose the database uses SQL (Tutorials on: <u>https://sqlbolt.com/lesson/select_queries_introduction</u>)
 - SELECT (username, password) FROM users WHERE username = 'neuronoverflow' and password = SHA256(secret + "my-super-secure-password!@#\$11")
 - Note:
 - The DB only stores the hash of the password
 - Suppose an adversary has access to the DB
 - They still need to compute the inverse to get the plaintext password



SECURITY EXPERIMENT: A BRUTE-FORCE ATTACKER

- Suppose a powerful adversary
 - who breached the server
 - who has the entire database dump (:= all the password hashes)
 - who has the entire program source code (:= hashing algorithm and the salt)
- If it is a brute-force attacker:
 - Generate all the possible password combinations (plaintext)
 - Compare them with the hashes in the database
 - Example:
 - for string in all_the_candidates:



SECURITY EXPERIMENT: A BRUTE-FORCE ATTACKER - CONT'D

- Time it takes to run:
 - for string in all_the_candidates:
 - If SHA256('secret' + string) == '59636881ab9bf34263cf3f4d90f25d2b91e74e8804b802d25c8f4bc5c80846ee': print(string)
 - $\sim 2^{256}$ seconds (:= 1 second / a bit)
- Good luck!



DOES IT MEAN THAT WE ARE SECURE?

- The security guarantee assumes
 - We choose the password randomly!
- In reality
 - (12345678) Easy to memorize and type
 - (OregonBeaverRocks) Some phrases familiar
 - (Oregon1234) Add numbers on the phrase
 - (password1234!!) Add special characters at the end

- ...



DOES IT MEAN THAT WE ARE SECURE?

- The security guarante
 - We choose the pass
- In reality

- ...

Oregon State

- (12345678) Easy to
- (OregonBeaverRock
- (Oregon1234) Add r
- (password1234!!) A

2	*****	Top Pass	30 Most words in the	Used World	
1	123456	n	abc123	21	princess
2	password	12	1234	22	letmein
3	123456789	13	password1	23	654321
4	12345	14	iloveyou	24	monkey
5	12345678	15	1q2w3e4r	25	27653
6	qwerty	16	000000	26	1qaz2wsx
7	1234567	17	qwerty123	27	123321
B	111111	18	zaq12wsx	28	qwertyuiop
9	1234567890	19	dragon	29	superman
10	123123	20	sunshine	30	asdfghjkl



SECURITY EXPERIMENT: DICTIONARY ATTACK

- Suppose that an adversary
 - Has a list of commonly used password
 - <u>https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/tree/master/Passwords/Common-Credentials</u>
- Search space is significantly reduced
 - Suppose that the password is
 - 13 characters and consists of [A-Za-z0-9]
 - = 62¹³ possible combinations (2.002854e²³)
 - Suppose that
 - We know the password starts from 'Portland'
 - = 62⁵ possible combinations (9.1613283e⁸)
 - = 10¹⁵ smaller



SECURITY EXPERIMENT: USE SPECIAL CHARACTERS

- Suppose that the password is 8 characters
 - [A-Z] 26⁸ = 208,827,064,576
 - [A-Za-z] 52⁸ = 53,459,728,531,456
 - [A-Za-z0-9] and special chars = 95⁸ = 6,634,204,312,890,625
 - 6,634 trillion cases
 - Good luck!



BRUTE-FORCE IS DIFFICULT; CAN WE EXPLOIT THE SYSTEM?

- Suppose the database uses SQL
 - SELECT (username, password) FROM users WHERE username = 'neuronoverflow' and password = SHA256(secret + "my-super-secure-password!@#\$11")



User Name or Email



Forgot your password?





CAN WE EXPLOIT THE SYSTEM? SQL INJECTION

- Suppose the database uses SQL
 - SELECT (username, password) FROM users WHERE username = 'neuronoverflow' and password = SHA256(secret + "my-super-secure-password!@#\$11")
- What if
 - We supply 'or 'a'='a as a password?
 - SELECT (username, password) FROM users WHERE username = 'neuronoverflow' and password = " or 'a' = 'a'
 - THIS IS ALWAYS TRUE!!!

CS370 Micro-labs	Users	Scoreboard	Challenges	≗ +	€
		Lc	gin		

User Name or Email	
Password	
Forgot your password?	Submit



CAN WE EXPLOIT THE SYSTEM? SQL INJECTION

- What if we supply 'or 'a'='a as a password?
 - SELECT (username, password) FROM users WHERE username = 'neuronoverflow' and password = " or 'a' = 'a'
- This allows us:
 - To bypass password checking logic
 - By injecting carefully-crafted malicious data to the database SQL query



CAN WE EXPLOIT THE SYSTEM? SQL INJECTION

- What if we supply 'union select ('admin', 'a') where 'a'='a as a password?
 - SELECT (username, password) FROM users WHERE
 - username = 'neuronoverflow' and password = " union select ('admin', 'a') where 'a'='a'
- How does it work?
 - None for the first select statement
 - and the 2nd statement will query
 - Username = 'admin'
 - Password = 'a'
 - Always return true 'a' = 'a'



TOPICS FOR TODAY

- Recap: SSL and TLS security
 - SSL/TLS handshakes (hello-s)
 - (Perfect) Forward Security
 - Example: a web-server with HTTPs
- Web security (authentication)
 - Password
 - Dictionary attack
 - SQL injection attack



Thank You!

Tu/Th 4:00 - 5:50 PM

Sanghyun Hong

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